Trumans Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb Essay Example

Trumans Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb Essay Why did Truman use the atomic bomb against Japan? What did his decision say about priorities of American foreign policy? | Truman decision and reasons behind deployment of the atomic bomb| | Min Yong Jung| 11/2/2010| | Harry S. Truman, the 33rd President of the United States, deployed the atomic bomb on Japan to ensure the end of the Pacific War with minimal US casualties. Upon rejection of the Potsdam Declaration and calls for unconditional surrender by the Japanese, the US in direct retaliation deployed the atomic weapon ‘Little Boy’ on the city of Hiroshima in August 6, 1945 and continued by bombing Nagasaki with ‘Fat Man’ on August 9th. The Allies had concluded the European front by capturing Berlin and defeating the remainder of Axis forces in May 1945. The Pacific front however remained and was different from combat in Europe; the ferocity of the Japanese to defend their homeland resulted in a higher level of casualties suffered by the US. Truman â€Å"never had any doubts†¦ had felt no qualms, about the atomic bombings because they forced an end to the war and saved American lives. †Thus in an effort to conclude the Pacific War, Truman deployed the Atomic Bomb in order to end the war that entrenched US resources and manpower for over 5 years and as a simple bonus to increase the bargaining capability of the US against the Soviet Union. The decision to deploy the atomic weapon was largely due to the fact that it would save the lives of American troops. We will write a custom essay sample on Trumans Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Trumans Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Trumans Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer Woodrow Wilson had been hailed as the man who kept the US out of a bloody First World War. US foreign policy of limiting casualties from war by whatever means necessary still exists in US foreign policy today, as it had back when Truman decided to deploy the atomic bomb. It is hard to measure the number of casualties for a war or an invasion that never occurred and the Pacific War in particular because of the fact that the Japanese were so fervent to fight until the last man, woman and child. The Joint War Plans Committee concluded that â€Å"the two phases of the invasion of Japan would cost about 46,000 American deaths and another 174,000 wounded and missing. † It is important to keep in mind that the battle of Okinawa resulted in â€Å"American casualties of 12,000 killed and missing and another 60,000 wounded† and the battle for Iwo Jima, â€Å"6,821 killed and nearly 20,000 wounded. † Truman and his advisors strenuously argued that the direct consequence of the atomic bomb was the ultimate surrender of the Japanese government and this achieved both US primary goals to both shorten the war and save American lives. Truman and his advisors decided on a course of action to limit American casualties whilst the Japanese, despite all claims that they were ready to surrender, were showing a level of intensity and ferocity in battle that the US troops had not encountered before. Thus it was impossible, whatever the pre-estimated figures of US casualties, to invade the mainland of Japan when military leaders of Japan decided that the â€Å"only course left is for Japan’s one hundred million people to sacrifice their lives by charging the enemy to make them lose the will to fight. The military leaders of Japan argued that â€Å"all man, woman, child and elderly would be drafted to fight the US troops, not to defeat it out right in battle but to ensure that increasing US casualties would bring about a turn in public sentiment† towards the war and thus ensure better terms for the post war Japan. The Japanese were both considered by the American public and fighting men to be racially inferio r but at the same time considered to be super human in battle. It was clear that the Japanese were running out of supplies and the military means to engage in successful battle. Thus they employed measures such as the Kamikaze pilots â€Å"The kamikazes were in many cases not effective†¦ But all too frequently they successfully carried out their missions. † The Kamikaze in direct translations means divine wind and is similar to the banzai charges that the army employed. Both shared similarities in that they were suicidal and not always effective in expelling the enemy but such military strategy emphasized Japan’s unwillingness to surrender. Japan with its long standing history of the Bushido code, emphasized the need for loyalty from its subjects. The Bushido code and determination of the Japanese leadership ensured the fact that an invasion into the mainland of Japan would provide high number of casualties for US troops and additionally â€Å"more exposure to an enemy that did not fear death which would bring about more results like the Indianapolis† on July 29th 1945, where the delivery of a Japanese torpedo resulted in the ship losing â€Å"880 of its crew of 1,196. † Thus the deployment of the two atomic bombs were not only necessary in that they would ensure the safety of US troops but it would also provide a shock factor to both the people and government of Japan. Air raid sirens had been turned off in Hiroshima, due to the fact that there were only several planes in the air. If one bomb and one plane could neutralize a city, there was little for the Japanese to do in defense against such a destructive weapon. Proponents of the argument that Truman was immoral in using the atomic bomb, constantly argue that the Japanese were depleted in their will and ability to wage war and were actively seeking chances to ending the war by means of diplomatic measures through peace feelers in the Soviet Union. The argument is one of those what if’s in history that can never be concluded by concrete measure. What the Truman administration and advisors were aware of was that the Japanese were determined to engage in battle with whatever resources they had available to them and the at the time Japanese peace efforts were not possible for them to comprehend as the Japanese Supreme Council itself was undecided on the matter and because of the need to attain unconditional surrender. Without unconditional surrender, Truman and his advisors felt they may be showing signs of weakness and thus emboldening the Japanese military who would view it as a sign of US weariness of war. If the United States appeared to weaken its demand in the wake of the difficulties its troops endured and the casualties they suffered during the Okinawa campaign, it would enhance the credibility of the argument that the Americans must be confronted with all-out resistance to the invasion of Japan. † The US and the world by this time identified the peace treaty of Versailles to be one of the leading causes of the Se cond World War. The Germans were not conquered and the reparation demands led to economic hardship that resulted in faith and support of an extremist Nazi party. Thus by giving in to the demands of the Japanese government the US felt they would encourage further aggression in the Pacific. The Office of War Information declared that Japan â€Å"will seek a compromise peace that will leave intact her present ruling clique and enough territory and industrial strength to begin again a career of aggressive expansion. † Truman, according to those close to him, was both fearful and nervous about expressing his own notion and thoughts into public policy. Thus he prioritized the need to keep in line with FDR’s policies and advisors. Because FDR championed the unconditional surrender and because the US public was adamant about it, Truman could not alter his course. James F. Byrnes, the secretary of state confided to his colleagues that a change in policy would bring about a domestic crucifixion of the president and this view was re-enforced by a Gallup poll that found â€Å"33 percent of those who responded thought the emperor should be executed and another 17 percent wanted to put him on trial; only 4 percent favored no punishment. If Truman gave into such demands, he would have faced harsh criticism from the US public, which could have resulted in decreasing his chances for re-election. The use of the atomic bomb provided a â€Å"diplomatic bonus† in that Truman would be able to strengthen his bargaining position with the Soviets after the war. Truman’s predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt concluded the Yalta Conference with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin in Feb. 1945. At the Yalta Conference Stalin emphasized Soviet interests in rebuilding â€Å"its devastated economy, possessions in Asia, influence over Poland, and a Germany so weakened it could never again march eastward. † With the instability created after the Second World War, Revisionists of the argument on Truman’s use of the atomic bomb believed that US deployed the atomic bomb in a demonstration to ward off Soviet interest in the regions highlighted at the Yalta Conference. After witnessing the course of the war and the successful Island Hopping campaign, where the Japanese were left to â€Å"wither on the vine† Truman believed that the Japanese government would surrender without having to create a second front and the use of the atomic bomb would not only shorten the war but also prevent Soviet interest and influence in Asia and ultimately shock the Soviet Union in the post war international arena, where the US could influence matters of interest through newly created international agencies that it dominated. Churchill noted the difference of Truman after the testing of the plutonium bomb in Almogordo. â€Å"He was a changed man who told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting. † The atomic bomb provided Truman, who had unexpectedly assumed presidency, with a confidence boost in dealing with foreign policy issues. The deployment of the bomb ultimately resulted in what the US had aimed for it to achieve. It ended the war with Japan and saved numerous US troops from Japan’s suicidal Banzai attacks and Kamikaze pilots. The bomb had shocked Joseph Stalin who remarked â€Å"Hiroshima has shaken the whole world†¦ The balance has been destroyed. † The Soviets were startled by the deployment of the atomic bomb and expedited their own process of building a similar weapon of mass destruction. When one considers the fact that the US were aware of other nation’s capabilities of producing an atomic weapon, the argument that the deployment of the bomb was to deter Soviet interests in future situations is not entirely persuasive due to the fact that the Soviets would soon have such capabilities. The US considered the Soviet issue a â€Å"diplomatic bonus† as they would only have this advantage for a short period of time. Ultimately the deployment of the atomic bomb under Truman’s guidance was influenced by the fact that it would bring an immediate end to the war with minimal casualties and provide a short term diplomatic advantage over the Soviet Union. The fact that unlike the First World War where the death of civilians on board the Maine and other civilians caught in the line of fire were considered unacceptable, the consensus shifted into considering that non-military deaths were considered acceptable. General Curtis E. LeMay, upon taking charge of the fire bombings in Japan, commanded that â€Å"there are no innocent civilians† and looked for ways to improve the effect of fire bombing on wooden Japanese cities. With the morality of the atomic bomb being deployed on Japan taken out of the equation, there was no incentive for Truman to not bomb Japan, which could ultimately raise the question of him being an incompetent commander at a later date when US casualty tolls increased and public sentiment against him. Work Cited Page * Hershberg, James G. Harvard to Hiroshima and the making of the nuclear age. New York: Alfred A. Knope. 1993. Pg. 290 * Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt Utter Destruction, The University of North Carolina Press. 1997,2004. * Paterson, Thomas G. American Foreign Relations. Boston: Wadsworth, 1895. Print. * Leapfrogging(strategy). Wikipedia. org. http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Leapfrogging_(strategy)  #cite_note-2 * Hershberg. Lecture [ 1 ]. Hershberg, James G. Harvard to Hiroshima and the making of the nuclear age. New York: Alfred A. Knope. 1993. Pg. 290. [ 2 ]. Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt Utter Destruction, The University of North Carolina Press. 997,2004. Pg. 38 [ 3 ]. Walker. Pg. 32 [ 4 ]. Walker Pg. 24 [ 5 ]. Walker Pg 30 [ 6 ]. Hershberg. Lecture [ 7 ]. Walker Pg 32 [ 8 ]. Hershberg. Lecture [ 9 ]. Walker Pg. 73 [ 10 ]. Walker Pg. 45 [ 11 ]. Walker Pg. 46 [ 12 ]. Walker Pg. 85 [ 13 ]. Walker Pg. 46 [ 14 ]. Paterson, Thomas G. American Foreign Relations. Boston: Wads worth, 1895. Print. 230 [ 15 ]. Paterson. Pg. 206 [ 16 ]. Leapfrogging(strategy). Wikipedia. org. http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Leapfrogging_(strategy)#cite_note-2 [ 17 ]. Walker Pg. 63 [ 18 ]. Walker. Pg. 81. [ 19 ]. Walker Pg. 27